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Abstract: We investigate how competition in product niches affects the ultimate timing of 
product release for experience goods using data on motion pictures in the United States. We 
identify product niches that movies occupy along three different product dimensions: common 
actor, common director, and common genre. We estimate the drivers for a motion picture´s 
weekly sales based on the variation in the level of competition in these particular niches over 
time. We show that release date of motion pictures are more likely rescheduled when there is 
more competition during the initially proposed release week. Next, we find that competition 
from movies by the same director or within the same movie genre decrease motion picture´s 
box office revenue most. Finally, we compare a movie’s actual sales to estimated sales at the 
originally planned release date. Rescheduled movies generate about $6 million more revenue 
than they would have at their originally proposed release date.  
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”We’ve been waiting six months for DreamWorks to change the date, and they weren’t 
going to do it,” said one person involved in “Gangs [of New York].” “Everyone talked some 
sense into Harvey. We said, ‘We’re not going up against their movie because they will win.’”1 
1 Introduction 
Movies compete for audience attention during a theatrical run of typically 8-10 weeks. 
When competing movies are too similar, such as sharing the same star cast member, it can be 
profitable to abandon a proposed release date and opt for later, second-best date. This was the 
case when two movies starring Leonardo DiCaprio were slated to open Christmas Day 2002. 
This episode highlights the strategic use of product release date to enter markets when 
competition is expected to be lighter. This movie strategic “microscheduling” was first 
proposed in Eliashberg et al. (2006). We investigate movie studios’ choices of the timing of 
product entry as a potential non-price strategy. 
The strategic choice of product release date is a concern in other industries as well. 
The relevant conditions can be characterized as a constant flow of new, limited-lifespan 
products being released into an uncertain competitive environment. In particular, this 
describes entertainment industries, such as music, books, video games, or motion pictures. 
The determination of the appropriate release date for a product must counterbalance two 
countervailing forces. On the one hand, producers want to publish when demand is especially 
high, usually during peak seasons. On the other hand, producers wish to avoid the possibly 
heavy competition from rival products during these periods of high demand. It could be 
optimal to select an off-peak release date if this means competing against fewer substitutes. 
Strategic planning of the release dates is especially prominent in the motion picture 
industry. Multiple movies are released every week and they have a short window of time to 
compete for customers. After this lifespan the movie is cycled out of the market and replaced 
                                                     
1 Laura Holson, New York Times, pg. C1, October 11, 2002 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/11/business/miramax-blinks-and-a-double-dicaprio-vanishes.html) 
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with a new one. In other settings, reducing prices could be used as a mechanism to increase 
demand of a product at the end of their lifecycle. In the motion picture industry, however, 
cinemas tend to charge uniform prices regardless of the movie quality or time in theaters 
(Orbach & Einav, 2007). With such short product life cycles and no price competition, the 
release date becomes one of the few strategic variables available to the studio. Accordingly, 
there may be room for additional profitability improvement by the microscheduling of movies 
(Eliashberg et al., 2006).  
The pattern of movie releases per week motivates our analysis. How does the pattern 
of releases per week compare to the pattern if weeks were chosen randomly? If a movie’s 
release date was chosen without reference to other movies’ release dates then the number of 
releases on any week should follow a binomial distribution.2 In the sample described below, 
4.5 movies were released each week on average. We simulated the distribution of movie 
releases each week under this independence assumption from 500 replications. Figure 1 
compares the expected number of movie releases each week to the actual number. The solid 
line represents the expected distribution while the dashed lines represent two standard 
deviations above or below the mean. The diamonds represent the actual distribution from our 
sample.3 Relative to what would be expected if release date decisions were independent of 
each other, it appears that the actual distribution puts less weight on weeks with 6 or more 
simultaneous movie releases and puts more weight on weeks with 3, 4, or 5 simultaneous 
releases. This is suggestive evidence of movie studio release date decisions being coordinated 
so as to avoid “too many” competing movies opening simultaneously rather than the decisions 
being independent of each other. Moreover, it suggests that studios coordinate so as to avoid 
the fiercest competition. Our further analysis tries to confirm this regularity. 
2 In the data below, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the number of releases is constant over the weeks of the 
year. 
3 We describe our sample in Section 4. 
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Figure 1: Actual versus Expected Distribution of Releases per Week 
 
 One complication with the exercise above is that not all movies are equal alternatives 
to one another. Our approach addresses this issue with a model that features both vertical and 
horizontal differentiation. Movie reviews (e.g. rotten tomatoes) provide a proxy for perceived 
quality while product niches are based on movies with a common genre, common sets of 
actors, or a common director. In this model, consumers prefer higher quality movies and 
consider movies within the same niche to be closer substitutes. When considering alternatives 
to a specific movie choice, consumers may be willing to trade off product quality for product 
closeness. Thus, movies face most of their competition from higher quality movies within 
their niche.  
We exploit data on both the characteristics and sales of recent movies and, for a subset 
of these movies, information on both an initially proposed release date and an actual release 
date. We hypothesize that, if the competitive landscape looks too daunting on the initially 
proposed release date, studios will abandon it in favor of another release date. A probit 
estimation of initial release date abandonment as a function of expected competition largely 
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confirms this hypothesis. Further, movie ticket sales are adversely affected by greater niche 
competition. 
We then estimate how much changing the release date is worth to the studio. This is 
simulated for rescheduled movies by comparing the expected sales between the initially 
proposed release date and the actual release date. To achieve this, we estimate a demand 
function for movies based on their own characteristics and the characteristics of other 
currently available competing movies. Since the characteristics of competing movies tend to 
be more favorable at the new date, the decision to change date tends to increase sales by about 
$6 million or 6.5%.  
Our analysis offers three main contributions to the field of product entry decisions in 
markets with short product life cycles and non-price competition. First, we confirm and 
quantify the additional profitability by microscheduling product releases as conjectured by 
Eliashberg et al. (2006). Second, we explore drivers for product release date changes with the 
aid of hypothetical competitive situations. Third, we add to the modelling of competition by 
establishing niche variables along horizontal product differentiation to model the competitive 
environment.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 goes through literature 
previously published in this field. Section 3 we provide the description of our model and 
econometrical approach, followed by a detailed description of the data we utilize in this 
approach in section 4. In section 5 we present our results and discuss them carefully. Finally, 
we conclude and point out directions further research in section 6.  
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2 Previous Literature 
The basic assumption in non-price competition applications is that prices are taken as a 
parameter by each player. So, in order to maximize profits, firms can only adjust the quality 
of their products or the associated advertising level (Archibald, 1964). Yet, competing in a 
market characterized by non-price competition is difficult as marginal costs of advertising and 
quality are higher than marginal cost of production (Stigler, 1968). The reasons for non-price 
competition are different, for example no price discrimination by regulation or in the case of 
the movie industry due to an implicit agreement between exhibitor and customer. In an 
application like this, instead of prices, quality and variety are drivers for demand (Calantone 
et al., 2010, Hatfield et al., 2012). Non-price competition has been studied in several 
entertainment industries including video games (Zhu & Zhang, 2010, Engelstätter & Ward, 
2016) and books (Chevalier & Mayzlin, 2006, Clay et al., 2002). Other non-entertainment 
industries where non-price competition has been investigated are (regulated) airline markets 
(Douglas & Miller, 1974), hospitals (Joskow, 1980), dry cleaners (Plott, 1965), and food retail 
(Richards & Hamilton, 2006).  
Entertainment goods, like movies, are classified as experience goods since their quality 
cannot be assessed a priori and only usage can reveal their actual quality (Elberse & 
Eliashberg, 2003). Therefore, critic´s reviews are very important as quality indicators and 
decision supporters because moviegoers want to decrease uncertainty and want to make sure 
not to attend a motion picture that does not meet their expectations. Basuroy et al. (2003) 
observes a dual role of critic´s reviews since they are influencers and as well predictors of 
revenues. 
The market for motion pictures is also subject to strong seasonal fluctuations. Einav 
(2007) identifies two peak seasons within one year, summer time and Christmas. He observes 
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that the strongest movies are released during peak seasons. Accordingly, seasonality reflects 
both a deviation in the underlying demand pattern but also a change in the movies´ quality. 
The underlying differences in demand are exogenous to firms’ decisions while the systematic 
differences in quality over the year result from firm decisions. Einav observes that one third 
of the seasonality can be attributed to quality differences. This result, and the lack of price 
competition, imply that choosing the appropriate release date is important to profitability 
(Einav, 2007). 
This tradeoff is studied in detail by Weinberg & Krider (1998) in their motion picture 
timing game. The authors also distinguish two high seasons, Christmas and the summer 
holidays and most blockbusters are released in either one of these peaks. The authors show 
that at least one movie should open at the beginning of the peak season. Considering two 
competing movies, it has to be the stronger one which should claim the earlier release date. 
Furthermore, the authors suggest that strong movies should compete head to head during peak 
seasons in order to capture as much of the demand rather than to shy away from each other. 
This is similar to the finding that there is a negative interaction effect between order of entry 
and market share (Kalyanaram et al., 1995). On average earlier entrants obtain a higher 
market share. This finding is also supported by Szymanski et al., 1995. Belleflamme & 
Paolini (2015) investigate the relation between budget and release date. They find that movies 
with higher budgets are released closer to the peak season. 
 
3 Empirical methodology  
The aim of our empirical approach is threefold. First in section 3.1, we identify drivers 
for release date changes with the help of the hypothetical release date. In section 3.2, we 
identify drivers for weekly sales. Here we show the impact of the competition a movie is 
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facing and establish the direction of correlation of the covariates. As a final step in section 
3.3, we perform a simulation in which we assess a hypothetical scenario that can be seen as a 
counterfactual and allows us to estimate the value of changing the release date.   
3.1 Abandoning a Scheduled Release Date 
We hypothesize that a studio is more likely to reschedule the release of a movie if it 
learns that the competition on the proposed date would be stronger. We are able to test this 
because we observe an initially proposed release date and an actual release date for a subset of 
movies. Our tests center on estimating how the likelihood of abandoning an initial release date 
is affected by measures related to the expected competition on that date. Our competition 
measures exploit both the horizontal and vertical nature of product differentiation by focusing 
on competing movies that have to have higher quality and share product characteristics with 
the focal movie. 
We use the Probit estimator to model movie rescheduling due to expected competition. 
The independent regressors include the characteristics of the focal film as well as measures 
related to the expected quality of movies with similar characteristics of the focal film. The 
variables measuring competition are all constructed for the initially proposed release date. 
Specifically, our estimating equation is the following: 
(1) 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅ℎ𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖~ Φ(𝛼𝛼1𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 
𝛼𝛼3𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼4𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼5𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 
𝛼𝛼6𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼7𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) 
Our measure of an individual movie’s expected quality is an aggregation of online reviews. 
We aggregate these for all movies in theaters for the week that that the focal movie is initially 
scheduled to be released into 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖. Because ticket sales decline quickly, we allow for a 
larger competitive effect from recent movie releases. Consequently, we construct 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 as the average quality of movies released within four week prior to movie i’s 
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initially proposed release date. We construct 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, and 𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 as the 
average quality of all movies in theaters the week that movie i was released that overlap with 
the focal movie’s principal cast members, director, and genre. Essentially, we interact movie 
quality with an indicator variable for each type of overlap before calculating the average. Our 
tests of hypothesis is that each of  𝛼𝛼1 through 𝛼𝛼5 are positive. Since stronger movies are less 
likely to reschedule (Weinberg & Krider, 1998) we include the quality and budget of the focal 
movie (𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 and 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖) to allow for more scheduling permanence for bigger 
movies. Finally, we include dummy variables 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 to control for seasonality and indicator 
variables for interactions. 
 
3.2 Descriptive sales estimation 
The above analysis tests whether movies are rescheduled for competitive reasons. 
Here we in turn attempt to estimate how much such a rescheduling might earn a movie studio. 
To accomplish this, we estimate movie ticket sales as a function of both movie characteristics 
and the competitive strength of alternative movies in theaters at the same time. For this 
analysis, we use the actual release dates whether the movie was rescheduled or not. We then 
use these parameter estimates to forecast what a rescheduled movie’s sales would have been 
had it not been rescheduled. Comparing the forecasts for the actual and these hypothetical 
release dates generates a change in sales due to rescheduling.  
Our specification for estimating the effect of competition on movie sales uses the 
competition measures described above. However, now we observe multiple observations for 
each movie representing sales for the different weeks of its theatrical run. While the focal 
movie’s characteristics do not vary over the theatrical run, the effect of competition does as 
new movies are released and others finish their runs. Similar to above, we hypothesize that 
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greater competition from higher quality movies that share product characteristics will depress 
sales. Our estimating equation is: 
(2) 
𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅(𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖) = 𝛽𝛽1𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 
𝛽𝛽3𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝛽𝛽5𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 
𝛽𝛽6𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
The natural logarithm of weekly sales for movie 𝐷𝐷 in week 𝑅𝑅 is regressed against the same 
variables as above. However, our control variables 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 now also include time trends for the 
number of weeks on the market. In order to allow for a non-linearity decay in sales over the 
theatrical run, the time trend also enters as a quadratic.4 Analogous to above, tests of our 
hypothesis is that 𝛽𝛽1through 𝛽𝛽5should be negative.  
Note that we do not refer to equation (2) as a structural demand function. First, the 
specification allows for factors that shift demand but not for reactions to price changes. We do 
not include a price variable mainly because there is almost no variation in prices across 
movies or over the theatrical run. Second, the omission of price does not mean that the 
estimates are bias free.  This is because, if microscheduling is important, movies will not be 
released during weeks when the expected competition is strongest. Instead, they will be 
rescheduled to a week with less overlap with competing movies. This could imply that we 
will observe higher sales occurring in periods with less competition by construction. Thus, the 
error term is correlated with the regressors which can lead to biased coefficient estimates.  
It may be possible to address another potential source of estimation bias due to 
endogeneity. Movies with larger production budgets tend to have higher quality production 
inputs. These could be better or well-known actors that draw larger audiences, more and 
better special effects, or more spectacular images from filming on location. At the same time 
however, for movies that are expected to draw larger audiences, the marginal value of these 
4 In unreported specifications, we also included dummies for the playing week. The estimates for the competition 
variables are virtually unchanged. 
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inputs might be higher. If so, the causality could be reversed with higher expected sales being 
correlated with both higher actual sales and higher budgets. 
We address this form of potential endogeneity with a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) 
model. In the first stage, we include distributor location dummies as instrumental variables for 
𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖.
5 Movie production largely takes advantage of locally sourced inputs including 
the technical crafts (e.g. wardrobe, makeup, set production, lighting, sound, etc.) and service 
industries (e.g., catering, transportation, etc.)  The state in which a distributor primarily 
operates impacts the budget available through clusters and connections, but should have 
virtually no impact on the sales of a particular movie in the second stage. Hence, our first-
stage regression becomes: 
(3) 
𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾1𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +                                          
𝛾𝛾3𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾4𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝛾𝛾5𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +           
𝛾𝛾6𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝜙𝜙𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖.                      
We modify equation (2) to add the 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴_𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 which are the predicted residuals from 
the first stage.  
(4) 
𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖~ 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝛽𝛽1𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +                              
𝛽𝛽3𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝛽𝛽5𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +        
𝛽𝛽6𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +                    𝛽𝛽8𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴_𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖).                                                
Estimates from Equation (4) should contain less bias than those from the specification 
represented by Equation (2). 
                                                     
5 In most cases, the distributor is also the production company. To be a valid IV, the distributor location 
dummies need only to be correlated with a movie’s budget. So long as they are not “weak” any mismeasurement 
does not bias the results. 
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3.3 Prediction 
We use our estimates of how competition affects sales from Equation (4) to estimate 
the effect that rescheduling movie releases had on sales. We hypothesize that rescheduling the 
release date increased sales. For rescheduled movies, we can compare the sales predicted by 
Equation (4) on the actual release date with the sales predicted on the initially proposed 
release date. This would be the case if variables measuring the competitive threat are more 
favorable on the new date than the abandoned date. It would further confirm that, not only 
was the competitive threat higher than normal on the initial date, but also that the studio 
sought out a week with a smaller competitive threat. 
Our test of hypothesis is that predicted sales of rescheduled movies increase because 
of the rescheduling. This is accomplished by replacing the values of the competition variables 
from the actual week of release with the values from the initially proposed week. If 
rescheduling was motivated by seeking a more favorable competition situation, then the sales 
for rescheduled movies should be greater on the actual release date than on the initially 
proposed release date.6  
4 Data and variables 
Our analysis makes use of a unique micro-level dataset created by merging three 
different data sources. The basis is the Internet Movie Database (IMDb)7 from which we 
obtained for each movie: weekly revenues, movies’ budget, the sets of actors, director, and 
the movies’ genres. To this, we append quality ratings from Metacritic, an online review 
aggregator.8 Metacritic reports different ratings by professional reviewers from online and 
6 Because our dependent variable is in logarithms, we adjust the predicted values by its variance (Cameron & 
Trivedi, 2009) 
7 http://www.imdb.com/ 
8 http://www.metacritic.com/ 
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offline sources into a single cardinal value, where 100 represents the best and 0 the worst 
possible outcome. Finally, we add release date information from Box Office Mojo9. Box 
Office Mojo lists initially planned and finally realized movie release dates. This allows us to 
identify which movies’ release dates were rescheduled and to distinguish both the initially 
proposed and actual release dates.  
Our data represents a panel spanning January 1, 2006 to January 17, 2014 and is 
restricted to the U.S. market. Our starting point is a sample of 2,732 movies from IMDb 
which received a Metacritic Rating. Usually, movies with small sales tend to not receive a 
Metacritic Rating. Box Office Mojo reported release date information for 2,567 of these 
movies and movie budget information was reported for 1,653 of these movies. The 
information from Box Office Mojo is crucial for our analysis as we need to know the release 
date changes. Movie ticket sales information is available for each movie so that these 1,653 
movies generate an unbalanced panel of 17,932 movie by week observations. We restricted 
the time in cinema to half a year i.e. 26 weeks resulting in 17,764 weekly observations for our 
final sample.10  
For some analyses, we restrict the sample to exclude movies whose release was 
postponed. Rescheduling a movie’s release could be for non-strategic reasons. For example, 
unforeseen delays in the production schedule could make it impossible for a producer to meet 
the initially proposed release date. In this case, movies that are postponed could be for either 
strategic reasons or for production delay reasons. However, it is less likely that an 
unanticipated hastening of production causes a movie to be released prior to its initially 
proposed release date. Thus, a sample that excludes postponed rescheduled releases will 
contain a large fraction of movies that were rescheduled for strategic reasons. Figure 2 
                                                     
9 http://www.boxofficemojo.com/ 
10 Only 2% of all movie releases have theatrical runs of more than 26 weeks. These tend to be children’s 
(animation) movies and even they receive the bulk of their sales during the first few months. 
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indicates that most rescheduling is toward later release dates where each bar represents one 
week. The sample with postponed movies excluded numbers 282 movies and 3,203 movie by 
week observations. 
Figure 2: Days between planned and actual release date (excluding non-rescheduled movies) 
 
Each movie observed is described by four variables key to our analysis. The dependent 
variable in Equation (1), 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅ℎ𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖, equals one for movie i if Box Office Mojo indicates the 
movie was released on a date different from its initially proposed release date and zero 
otherwise. We also set this to zero for the 60 movies with no information on an initially 
proposed release date. The dependent variable in Equations (2) and (4) is the weekly revenues 
in millions of US dollars of a movie in all US movie theaters. We identify 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 with 
the movie’s Metacritic rating and 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 with the movie’s overall budget  in millions 
of US dollars.  
I addition, we construct five variables to measure the competition the focal movie 
would face. The variable 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the average quality (i.e., Metacritic rating) of all movies 
currently showing in theaters in week t and 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the average quality of movies 
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released on week t or within four week prior to t. We construct three variables to capture 
competition from more similar movies. The variable 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the average quality of 
movies showing at time t that share a common principle cast member as movie i. We take 
actors listed as ‘stars’ on IMDB as they represent the relevant ‘brand’ differentiating a movie 
from its competitors. Similarly, 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the average quality of movies showing at time t 
that were directed by the same director as movie i and 𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the average quality of 
movies showing at time t that share a common genre designation as movie i (e.g. comedy, 
action, horror, and so on). Our data sometimes features no shared actor or director. To 
indicate these cases we construct an overlap dummy that is one if there is an overlap and zero 
otherwise.   
The different analyses require control variables, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. We account for general 
seasonality in both the demand and supply with week-of-year dummy variables. In the sales 
estimations, we account for the decay in movie sales over the theatrical run with a variable 
measuring weeks since release and its square.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min. Max. 
 Entire sample 17,764 Obs. Exclude Postponed Releases 14,561 Obs. 
         
Weekly sales in 
millions 
4.49 12.81 0.00 218.00 4.37 12.60 0.00 189.00 
         
Rescheduled release 
date 
0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
         
Quality  56.38 17.58 7.00 96.00 56.85 17.41 7.00 96.00 
         
Budget in millions 49.41 57.99 0.00 339.00 47.50 57.09 0.00 339.00 
         
Week since release 7.70 5.37 1.00 26.00 7.69 5.39 1.00 26.00 
         
Quality of recent 
releases 
55.88 4.27 0.00 96.00 55.89 4.19 0.00 96.00 
         
Quality all concurrent 
movies 
59.14 2.24 43.77 74.00 59.11 2.24 43.77 74.00 
         
Quality same actor  24.95 30.47 0.00 97.00 22.78 29.95 0.00 97.00 
         
Overlap same actor 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
         
Quality same director 10.34 23.76 0.00 95.00 6.99 20.29 0.00 95.00 
         
Overlap same director 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 
         
Quality same genre 57.28 4.61 0.00 83.00 57.18 4.63 0.00 83.00 
         
 
Table 1 summarizes the sales data. The average movie had $4.49 million in sales on an 
average week. The maximum of $218 million was for the opening weekend of ‘Transformers: 
Revenge of the Fallen’ in 2009. One-quarter of all movies were rescheduled.  Metacritic 
ratings, which can take on values between 0 and 100, had an average of 56 with a maximum 
of 96 (‘Ratatouille’ 2007, ‘Gravity’ 2013) and a minimum of 7 (‘Miss March’ 2009). The 
average week since release was 7.7 weeks indicating that the average theatrical run was 15 
weeks. Recent releases had a smaller average quality than all competing movies which is 
consistent with better movies having longer theatrical runs. Quality actor niche and quality 
director niche have with 24.94 and 10.34 points a smaller average as quality genre niche with 
57.28. This is due to the fact that competition is less frequently observed in these niches and 
then set to zero. The maximum of the actor niche is with 97 points higher as the quality itself. 
The reason for this peculiarity is that we first calculated the average niche competition before 
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excluding movies without the entire range of information thereby using as much information 
as possible in the econometrical analysis. 
Average movie sales fall precipitously over its theatrical run. Typically, a movie 
generates most of its sales in its release week with a steady decline in the following weeks. As 
sales taper off, some theaters stop showing it. The blue bars in Figure 3 show the distribution 
of the length of theatrical runs. The percentage of movies with ever longer theatrical runs 
declines steadily with no more than 2% having runs longer than 26 weeks. The yellow bars 
Figure 3 shows average weekly dollar sales. Average sales fall per week fall not only because 
movies fewer movies have long theatrical runs, but also because sales per week decline 
conditional on the movie still being shown in theaters.  
Figure 3: Average sales & number of movies over theatrical run 
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5 Estimation results 
In the following three subsections we present the results of the estimations and the 
simulation. To summarize, we find that rescheduling is related to stronger competition, that 
sales fall with stronger competition, and that rescheduling results in a 7% increase in sales.  
 
5.1 Rescheduling 
In Table 2, we report the coefficient estimates for the release date rescheduling 
analysis following equation 1. The first three columns include all movies while the next three 
exclude movies with postponed rescheduled release dates. Recall that postponed releases are 
more likely to have been caused by production delays. Thus, we expect stronger strategic 
effects to be present in columns (d) through (f) and they are. In addition, columns (b) and (e) 
exclude the focal movie’s budget since it could be endogenous and columns (c) and (e) 
include dummy variables for the different movie distributors since to control for some studios 
being better at movie production. In columns (c) and (f) we also include the aforementioned 
overlap dummies for actor and director. 
The coefficient for quality is negative, meaning that the higher the quality of a movie, 
the less likely it is to be rescheduled by the distributor. This coefficient shows that the 
distributors know the quality of their movies very well and can judge whether to release as 
planned or find another releasing date. This finding is consistent with distributors’ strong 
movies competing head to head while weaker movies being more likely to delay their release 
as proposed by Weinberg & Krider (1998). The movie’s budget as well as the average of all 
and recently released competitors do not have an impact on the probability of rescheduling the 
movie.  
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Table 2: Probability of release date change 
Probit (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
 All Movies Postponed movies excluded 
Quality -0.0094*** -0.0099*** -0.0007 -0.0209*** -0.0210*** 0.0054 
  (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0029) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0070) 
       
Budget  0.0029*** 0.0013  0.0014 -0.0012 
  (0.0008) (0.0012)  (0.0018) (0.0029) 
        
Quality young comp. -0.0269** -0.0306*** -0.0466*** 0.0165 0.0138 0.0237 
  (0.0112) (0.0115) (0.0131) (0.0429) (0.0426) (0.0512) 
       
Quality all comp. 0.0034 0.0090 -0.0066 -0.0609 -0.0565 -0.1686*** 
  (0.0242) (0.0240) (0.0244) (0.0516) (0.0501) (0.0584) 
        
Quality Actor Niche 0.0030** 0.0025* -0.0051 0.0077*** 0.0074** -0.0246** 
  (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0051) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0104) 
       
Overlap Actor niche   0.3750   1.9625*** 
   (0.3002)   (0.6284) 
        
Quality Director Niche 0.0293*** 0.0289*** -0.0060 0.0530*** 0.0527*** -0.0146 
  (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0079) (0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0141) 
       
Overlap Director Niche   2.1758***   4.8056*** 
   (0.4680)   (0.8571) 
        
Quality Genre Niche 0.0335*** 0.0422*** 0.1070*** 0.0694*** 0.0724*** 0.2071*** 
  (0.0097) (0.0102) (0.0147) (0.0212) (0.0221) (0.0417) 
          
Week & year dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Distributor, Genre & 
MPAA Dummies 
no no yes no No yes 
Pseudo R2 0.2418 0.2479 0.3331 0.6199 0.6206 0.7579 
# Obs. 1,653 1,653 1,653 1,370 1,370 1,370 
Dummies are included for director, actor, and genre, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
The variables representing competition from the most similar movies all have the 
expected sign and are largely significant. This indicates that movies that would face higher 
quality close substitutes are more likely to reschedule. These effects are larger for genre and 
director similarity. These results indicate that distributors come to understand how the 
competitive landscape is shaping up and they act on this understanding to insure more 
favorable competition for their movie. However, the competition from overlapping movies is 
important to distributors when deciding to reschedule the release date. The marginal effect at 
the mean for the actor, director and genre niche when the quality increases by one percentage 
point and the overlap dummy is held constant is 0.56 (significant at the five percent level), 
3.98 and 11.86 (both significant at the five percent level) percent respectively. If the quality in 
19 
 
the actor or director niche increases by one standard deviation, the probability that a movie is 
rescheduled increases by 8.39 and 66.87 percent. In contrast if there is one standard deviation 
change in the quality of movies in the genre niche, the probability of rescheduling increases 
by 47.42 percent. This indicates that director and genre similarity are more important drivers 
for a change in the release date than an actor overlap. Overall, these results indicate that our 
measures of competition seem to capture the differential effects of more similar movies for 
this strategic decision.  
5.2 Descriptive sales estimation 
Analogously to Table 2, Table 3 shows the results of the sales estimation following 
equation 2. In column (a) the budget and distributor dummies are not included. In column (b) 
the budget is added, and in column (c) the distributor dummies are added. As expected the 
coefficient for quality shows a positive impact on sales. As the weekly sales are estimated in 
logarithms, an increase of one quality point (which take on values between 0 and 100) results 
in a 1.6 to 2.2 percent increase in weekly sales depending on the specification. A movie’s 
budget also impacts sales positively. Increasing the budget by one million dollars increases 
weekly sales by 1.8 respectively 1.2 percent. The coefficients for the movie’s age and age 
squared indicate that sales decline with time in the theaters but at a declining rate. This can be 
seen in a plot of the predicted values in Figure 7 in the Annex. While there is no impact from 
the average of more recent competing movies, there is positive impact from the average 
quality of all competitors. This must be interpreted in light of the competition variables that 
aggregate over close substitute movies. The coefficient for all movies can be interpreted as the 
effect of movies that are not close substitutes. One possibility is that these movies are more 
likely to be sold out, causing some patrons to choose the focal movie as a second-best 
alternative. This covariate will include the seasonality in quality of available movies as it has 
been described by Einav (2007). Einav argues that not only does consumer demand exhibit 
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seasonality, but that producers’ releases also exhibit seasonality in both the number and 
quality of movies released. Distributors tend to release movies of higher quality in periods of 
high demand. The weekly dummies will capture demander-side seasonality while the 
covariate All Quality will include seasonality on the side of suppliers. Focusing on the niches, 
it turns out that the niches for director and genre are harmful for a movies success in terms of 
sales. The coefficients of the genre and the director niche are negative indicating that high 
competition in these two niches impacts weekly sales negatively. However, this just provides 
a rough descriptive estimation of the model. The results of our final model are provided in 
section 4.3. 
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Table 3: Sales estimation 
OLS (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
 All Movies Postponed Movies Excluded 
Quality 0.0172*** 0.0163*** 0.0216*** 0.0198*** 0.0178*** 0.0226*** 
  (0.0030) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0033) (0.0029) (0.0030) 
       
Budget  0.0176*** 0.0118***  0.0183*** 0.0122*** 
  (0.0008) (0.0010)  (0.0010) (0.0011) 
        
Age -0.4044*** -0.4377*** -0.4578*** -0.3871*** -0.4248*** -0.4495*** 
  (0.0147) (0.0142) (0.0136) (0.0164) (0.0159) (0.0151) 
       
Age squared 0.0087*** 0.0091*** 0.0094*** 0.0081*** 0.0088*** 0.0093*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
       
Quality recent comp. -0.0039 -0.0048 0.0014 -0.0108 -0.0110 -0.0038 
  (0.0075) (0.0065) (0.0056) (0.0088) (0.0075) (0.0064) 
       
Quality all comp. 0.1031*** 0.0735*** 0.0199 0.1136*** 0.0768*** 0.0186 
  (0.0220) (0.0197) (0.0174) (0.0253) (0.0227) (0.0201) 
        
Quality Actor Niche 0.0098*** 0.0067*** -0.0079** 0.0109*** 0.0076*** -0.0077** 
  (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0031) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0036) 
       
Overlap Actor Niche   0.6435***   0.6578*** 
   (0.1916)   (0.2201) 
        
Quality Director Niche 
  
-0.0065*** -0.0093*** 0.0114 -0.0079*** -0.0102*** 0.0130 
(0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0078) (0.0029) (0.0025) (0.0094) 
       
Overlap Director Niche   -1.2873**   -1.4690** 
   (0.5201)   (0.6394) 
        
Quality Genre Niche -0.1938*** -0.1223*** -0.0524*** -0.2038*** -0.1296*** -0.0507*** 
  (0.0138) (0.0119) (0.0121) (0.0152) (0.0131) (0.0131) 
          
Week & year dummies  yes yes yes Yes Yes yes 
Distributor, Genre & 
MPAA Dummies 
no no yes No No yes 
R2 0.324 0.454 0.557 0.319 0.449 0.559 
# Obs. 17,764 17,764 17,764 14,561 14,561 14,561 
Standard errors are clustered at the movie level. Dummies are included for director, actor, and genre, * p < 0.1, ** 
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
5.3 Prediction 
The final step in our methodology is to simulate the change in movies sales due to 
rescheduling. As already mentioned in equation 4 in section 3.3, we use a nonlinear model. 
We have two reasons for doing so. The first one is that by estimating a non-linear model we 
avoid the problem of retransformation. This means that when we predict fitted values with 
this model, we directly receive actual dollar values in comparison to the natural logs we 
would receive using standard IV with logged dependent variable. Secondly, the predicted 
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values show a much better fit with the actual data in comparison to a standard IV with logged 
dependent variable.  Especially when compared to a linear model the fit is 350 fold 
better.11Following the approach from Cameron & Trivedi (2009) we first estimate a Poisson 
regression. However, according to the test of over-dispersion our data show variation that is 
greater than the mean, a violation of the assumptions of the Poisson model.12 Therefore, we 
adopt the more general negative binomial regression (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). 
Additionally, one might argue that the budget is not exogenous as it is probably correlated 
with the (expected) sales. As described in section 3.2, we address this objection by estimating 
the budget on the first stage with the help of the distributors’ locations as instrumental 
variables and adding the control function for budget in the second stage. We use state 
dummies of distributors’ locations as instruments as they are highly correlated with the budget 
a distributor can expend for a movie but is not correlated with the sales in the second stage. A 
list with all the states is included in Table 7 in the Annex. 
  
                                                     
11 The square root of the mean squared error is 3.8 million USD for the negative binomial estimator and 1,360 
million USD for ordinary least squares.   
12 We have to reject the hypothesis that the data is not over dispersed ( 𝑅𝑅 − 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 =  5.33). We conclude that 
we have over dispersed data. 
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Table 4: Negative binomial estimation 
Negative binomial 2nd stage of IV All movies Postponed Movies Excluded 
    
Quality 0.0224*** 0.0264*** 
 (0.0030) (0.0030) 
   
Budget  0.0128*** 0.0122*** 
  (0.0011) (0.0010) 
   
Age -0.5617*** -0.5730*** 
 (0.0184) (0.0224) 
   
Age squared 0.0144*** 0.0148*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0012) 
   
Quality recent comp. -0.0121* -0.0139* 
 (0.0070) (0.0078) 
   
Quality all comp. -0.0017 -0.0051 
  (0.0241) (0.0248) 
   
Quality Actor Niche -0.0048 -0.0043 
  (0.0034) (0.0034) 
   
Overlap Actor Niche 0.3455 0.3792* 
 (0.2101) (0.0685) 
   
Quality Director Niche -0.0009 0.0194 
  (0.0099) (0.0165) 
   
Overlap Director Niche -0.2809 -0.9111 
 (0.7073) (0.8820) 
   
Quality Genre Niche -0.0331* -0.0293 
 (0.0174) (0.0220) 
    
Control function -0.0048*** -0.0055*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0008) 
     
Week & year dummies  yes yes 
Distributor, Genre & MPAA 
Dummies 
yes yes 
LR χ2 24,102.19 20524.69 
p>χ2 0.0000 0.0000 
# Clusters 1,653 1,370 
# Obs. 17,764 14,561 
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at movie level and are bootstrapped from 114/116 replications. 
Dummies included for week and year, distributor, actor, and genre * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
To test whether the budget is endogenous we performed a robust Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test of endogeneity. It generated an F-statistic of 108.17 with 26 degrees of freedom 
for a P-value of 0.000 rejecting the hypothesis that Budget𝑖𝑖 is exogenous, thereby verifying 
our IV approach. Additionally, we can reject the hypothesis that we have weak instruments as 
the test of joint significance on the first stage for all instruments revealed an F-statistic of 
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21.94. Table 4 shows the outcome for the second stage in the two stage least squares model13. 
The marginal effect at the mean for the actor and director niche when quality increases by one 
standard deviation and the overlap dummy is held constant is 1.89 (not significant) and -5.07 
(significant at the one percent level) respectively. Hence, if the quality in the director niche 
increases by one standard deviation, sales will decrease by about five percent if quality in the 
director niche increases by one standard deviation. The marginal effect at the mean for the 
genre niche is -8.956 (significant at the five percent level). So an increase in quality of one 
standard deviation implies a reduction of sales by about nine percent. As this model is better 
identified, the coefficients in Table 4 are less biased estimates of the true parameters 
compared to the coefficients obtained in Table 3. 
Figure 4 compares the actual weekly sales to the sales predicted by the model over the 
playing weeks. Overall, the week sales are slightly under-predicted except for weeks two and 
three which end up slightly over-predicted. However, overall the fit is quite good.  
Figure 4: Predicted vs. actual weekly sales 
 
                                                     
13 The first stage of the model is reported in the Annex. 
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Multiplying the coefficients from Table 4 with the respective independent variables at 
the hypothetical release date generates our estimate of the unobserved hypothetical sales. In 
short, this simply entails substituting the values of the competition variables for the week in 
question.  In Figure 5 we compare these simulated hypothetical sales to predicted actual sales. 
Again, we present this result over the theatrical run, but the first few weeks dominate overall 
sales and the estimated difference in sales. For nearly every week, the simulated hypothetical 
sales stay below the predicted actual sales indicating that at the initially planned point in time 
the distributors would have made fewer sales as they did at the actual release date. On average 
this sums up to $6.37 million additional revenue per movie an equivalent of about 7%.  
Figure 5: Comparison hypothetical to actual sales 
 
Whether the change in movie date is profitable depends on whether the additional 
revenue exceeds any costs incurred due to the change. These costs are likely to be associated 
with any sunk marketing costs that are specific to the initial date. If the movie release is 
rescheduled soon enough, these could be minimal. We do not have marketing expenses but 
the rule of thumb could be that a movie’s marketing costs are about 50% of the production 
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budget or averaging about $25 million in our sample.14 However, it is likely that only a small 
fraction of this will be specific to the initial date. So long as this sunken portion is less than 
about 7%, changing the release date is profitable on average. 
Figure 6: Comparison hypothetical to actual sales excluding postponed movies 
 
In Figure 6, where we restrict our attention to movies that exclude postponed 
rescheduling the difference between actual and hypothetical release date becomes even 
bigger. Here the additional revenue sums up to $7.80 million, an equivalent of 8 percent. 
  
                                                     
14 See http://entertainment.howstuffworks.com/movie-cost1.htm and 
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/mar/06/business/fi-boxoffice6.  
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6 Conclusion and Future Work 
There are several strategic actions firms can take to increase profitability, with one of 
these being the timing of new product entry. The movie industry provides a fertile setting to 
study this because, as the release date nears, few other strategic actions, such as adjusting 
price or content are employed. We show that micro-scheduling new product releases can 
increase revenue significantly. We exploit those cases when distributors change the product’s 
release date to show that 1) releases are rescheduled when competition is expected to be 
stronger, 2) that sales decline when competition is stronger, and 3) that the revenues increase 
by 7-8% on average due to weaker competition at the rescheduled date. The costs incurred 
with such a change are likely small enough making these changes overall profitable. 
Moreover, it is likely that the expected level of competition at the release date is considered 
by the distributors even for movies that were not rescheduled making observing the 
competitive landscape even more crucial to generate revenue in this industry.  
We expect this strategic importance of the release date to hold for other entertainment 
markets as well. In these markets, content and production decisions are important overall but, 
as with movies, are sunk well before the product is marketed. Advertising and promotion are 
largely tied to budget or quality although there is first evidence for movies that these are 
adjusted based on viewer reactions (Lampe, 2015). At least for movies and video games, other 
features of these industries render price to be of little use as a strategic variable (Orbach & 
Einav, 2007, Engelstätter & Ward, 2016). Therefore, once the entertainment product becomes 
marketable, there are few other strategic variables besides release date left.  
Our work points out several directions for future research. Given appropriate data a 
confirmation of our results in other entertainment industries, like, e.g., video games, music or 
books, is desirable. Also, a model describing how a distributor should choose the optimal 
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release date might yield insights into how firms balance between several dimensions of 
competition and consumer demand.  
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Annex 
Table 5: Summary statistics cross section 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
 Whole sample 1,653 Obs. Exclude Postponed Releases 1,370 Obs. 
         
Weekly sales in millions 16.28 27.51 0.00 218.00 15.76 27.34 0.00 189.00 
         
Rescheduled release date 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
         
Quality  52.73 17.03 7.00 96.00 52.96 16.97 7.00 96.00 
         
Budget in millions 39.24 49.99 0.00 339.00 37.27 49.06 0.00 339.00 
         
Week since release 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
         
Quality of recent releases 55.95 4.54 0.00 80.67 56.00 4.36 0.00 80.67 
         
Quality all concurrent 
movies 
59.13 2.41 43.77 74.00 59.09 2.35 43.77 74.00 
         
Quality same actor  20.59 28.89 0.00 97.00 20.30 28.80 0.00 97.00 
         
Overlap same actor 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 
         
Quality same director 6.41 18.90 0.00 95.00 6.10 18.51 0.00 95.00 
         
Overlap same director 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
         
Quality same genre 57.35 4.64 38.00 73.00 57.26 4.64 38.25 73.00 
         
 
 
Figure 7: Age Digression Effect 
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Table 6: First stage of IV 
OLS first stage of IV (1) 
 Budget 
  
Quality 0.3071*** 
 (0.0859) 
  
Age 0.8282*** 
 (0.2418) 
  
Age squared -0.0137 
 (0.0147) 
  
Quality recent comp. 0.0705 
 (0.1194) 
  
Quality all comp. 0.3852 
  (0.4376) 
  
Quality Actor Niche 0.2238* 
  (0.1256) 
  
Overlap Actor Niche -6.1925 
 (6.8769) 
  
Quality Director Niche 0.1513 
  (0.2228) 
  
Overlap Director Niche -5.4202 
 (12.1667) 
  
Quality Genre Niche -1.4771*** 
 (0.3312) 
  
# Clusters 1,653 
#Obs. 17,764 
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at movie level.  
Dummies included for week and year, distributor, genre,  
and state * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 7: Filming locations used as instruments 
Number State # F-Test Chi2 
1 Australia 47 10.32 0.0013 
2 California 1,244 33.83 0.0000 
3 Canada 3 4.71 0.0301 
4 Colorado 1 11.57 0.0007 
5 Connecticut 1 1.65 0.1989 
6 Florida 2 26.43 0.0000 
7 France 2 49.28 0.0000 
8 Georgia 1 4.32 0.0378 
9 Germany 2 33.40 0.0000 
10 Hungary 1 0.20 0.6553 
11 Illinois 5 1.86 0.1729 
12 India 9 3.39 0.0657 
13 Ireland 1 6.15 0.0133 
14 Maine 2 1.54 0.2152 
15 Malaysia 1 7.34 0.0068 
16 Massachusetts 2 12.94 0.0003 
17 New Jersey 2 31.52 0.0000 
18 New York 293 9.57 0.0020 
19 Ohio 1 2.02 0.1559 
20 Oklahoma 1 - - 
21 Ontario 4 14.09 0.0002 
22 Pennsylvania 3 9.09 0.0026 
23 Texas 7 1.86 0.1727 
24 United Kingdom 9 4.53 0.0335 
25 Utah 7 4.79 0.0287 
26 Washington 1 11.13 0.0009 
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